President Obama will make his speech this evening outlining his decisions to send 30,000 or more U.S. soldiers to Afghanistan.  Obama’s decision is a big disappointment to many of his supporters. Jennifer Brunner, for example, Ohio’s Democratic Secretary of State who wants to be elected to the U.S. Senate, writes, Time To Bring Home The Troops.

Michael Moore gives a good flavor of the disappointment over Obama’s Afghanistan decision.  In his open letter to Obama, Moore asks President Obama, “Do you really want to be the new ‘war president’?” Moore says to the President,“You know that nothing good can come from sending more troops halfway around the world to a place neither you nor they understand, to achieve an objective that neither you nor they understand, in a country that does not want us there.”

Peter Bergan

Moore makes a huge accusation.  After reading Moore, I did some Google research. I found two articles by Peter Bergan, who is a national security analyst for CNN. Bergan has been a frequent visitor to Afghanistan, and has written several books including “The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader.”

Bergen’s view is quite opposite of Moore’s and seems based on solid information, much of which I’ve not heard before.  He makes a good case and much of the information he writes, I’m sure, has been the type of information President Obama has been studying over the last few weeks. Here are excerpts from the two articles:

From The U.S. is losing Afghanistan on two fronts (published 10/26/09):

1. We are losing in Afghanistan, on two fronts. The most important center of gravity of the conflict — as the Taliban well recognizes — is the American public. And now, most Americans are opposed to the war.
2. The American public would be more likely to tolerate the losses of blood and treasure in Afghanistan if they saw real progress being made there. And right now, they don’t.
3. The second front we’re losing is the Afghans themselves … (because we) are not providing large swaths of the Afghan population with the most basic public good, which is security.
4. The last government to provide Afghans with real security was … the Taliban. When they ruled the country before 9/11, security came at a tremendous price: a brutal, theocratic regime that bankrupted the country and was a pariah on the world stage.
5. But in the context of Afghan history, the Taliban bringing security was decisively important, since what had immediately preceded their iron rule was a nightmarish civil war during which you could be robbed or killed at will by gangs of roving ethnic and tribal militias.
6. A glaring symbol of the collapse of security in the country is the 300-mile Kabul-to-Kandahar highway, economically and politically the most important road in the country, which is now too dangerous to drive on.
7. If President Obama is serious about securing the country and rolling back the Taliban, he really doesn’t have much choice but to put significant numbers of more troops on the ground. That way, he can start winning the war: win back the American public, roll back the Taliban — who have melded ideologically and tactically with al Qaeda — and provide real security to the Afghan people.
8. In one of the most important strategic shifts since 9/11, the Pakistani military and government are now getting serious about wiping out large elements of the Taliban and allied groups on their territory and, most importantly, are doing it with the support of their population.
9. No longer are Pakistani military operations against militants in Swat and Waziristan seen by Pakistanis as “America’s war”: they are now seen as being in the vital interests of the Pakistani state because the Pakistani Taliban and other jihadist groups have made major strategic errors since early 2009, including marching close to Islamabad, attacking Pakistan’s equivalent of the Pentagon and killing hundreds of Pakistani soldiers and policemen.

From Winning the Good War:  Why Afghanistan is not Obama’s Vietnam (Published in August, 2009, in Washington Monthly.)

1. The growing skepticism about Obama’s chances for success in Afghanistan is largely based on deep misreadings of both the country’s history and the views of its people, which are often compounded by facile comparisons to the United States’s misadventures of past decades in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
2. Afghanistan will not be Obama’s Vietnam, nor will it be his Iraq. Rather, the renewed and better resourced American effort in Afghanistan will, in time, produce a relatively stable and prosperous Central Asian state….The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés.
3. The Soviet army killed more than a million Afghans and forced some five million more to flee the country, creating what was then the world’s largest refugee population. The Soviets also sowed millions of mines (including some that resembled toys), making Afghanistan one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. And Soviet soldiers were a largely unprofessional rabble of conscripts who drank heavily, used drugs, and consistently engaged in looting. The Soviets’ strategy, tactics, and behavior were, in short, the exact opposite of those used in successful counterinsurgency campaigns.
4. Even the most generous estimates of the size of the Taliban force hold it to be no more than 20,000 men, while authoritative estimates of the numbers of Afghans on the battlefield at any given moment in the war against the Soviets range up to 250,000. The Taliban insurgency today is only around 10 percent the size of what the Soviets faced.
5. Certainly endemic low-level warfare is embedded in Pashtun society—the words for cousin and enemy in Pashtu, for instance, are the same. But the level of violence in Afghanistan is actually far lower than most Americans believe. In 2008 more than 2,000 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the Taliban or coalition forces; this is too many, but it is also less than a quarter of the deaths last year in Iraq, a country that is both more sparsely populated and often assumed to be easier to govern. (At the height of the violence in Iraq, 3,200 civilians were dying every month, making the country around twenty times more violent than Afghanistan is today.)
6. Afghanistan is a much older nation-state than, say, Italy or Germany, both of which were only unified in the late nineteenth century. Modern Afghanistan is considered to have emerged with the first Afghan empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, and so has been a nation for decades longer than the United States. Accordingly, Afghans have a strong sense of nationhood.
7. The similarities between the Taliban and the Vietcong end with their mutual hostility toward the U.S. military. The some 20,000 Taliban fighters are too few to hold even small Afghan towns, let alone mount a Tet-style offensive on Kabul. As a military force, they are armed lightly enough to constitute a tactical problem, not a strategic threat. By contrast, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army at the height of the Vietnam War numbered more than half a million men who were equipped with artillery and tanks, and were well supplied by both the Soviet Union and Mao’s China.
8. Skeptics of Obama’s Afghanistan policy say that the right approach is to either reduce American commitments there or just get out entirely. The short explanation of why this won’t work is that the United States has tried this already—twice. In 1989, after the most successful covert program in the history of the CIA helped to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration closed the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The Clinton administration subsequently effectively zeroed out aid to the country, one of the poorest in the world.
9. Out of the chaos of the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s emerged the Taliban, who then gave sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2001, the next Bush administration returned to topple the Taliban, but because of its ideological aversion to nation building it ensured that Afghanistan was the least-resourced per capita reconstruction effort the United States has engaged in since World War II. An indication of how desultory those efforts were was the puny size of the Afghan army, which two years after the fall of the Taliban numbered only 5,000 men, around the same size as the police department of an American city like Houston.
10. The Afghan people themselves, the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency, are rooting for us to win. BBC/ABC polling found that 58 percent of Afghans named the Taliban—who only 7 percent of Afghans view favorably—as the greatest threat to their nation; only 8 percent said it was the United States.
11. Refugees don’t return to places they don’t think have a future, and more than four million Afghan refugees have returned home since the fall of the Taliban. (By contrast, about the same number of Iraqi refugees fled their homes after the American-led invasion of their country in 2003, and few have returned.) There are also more than two million Afghan kids in schools, including, of course, many girls. Music, kites, movies, independent newspapers, and TV stations—all of which were banned under the Taliban—are now ubiquitous. One in six Afghans now has a cell phone, in a country that didn’t have a phone system under the Taliban. And, according to the World Bank, the 2007 GDP growth rate for Afghanistan was 14 percent. Under Taliban rule the country was so poor that the World Bank didn’t even bother to measure its economic indicators.
12. Another possible objection to the introduction of more U.S. soldiers into Afghanistan is that, inevitably, they will kill more civilians, the main issue that angers Afghans about the foreign military presence. In fact, the presence of more boots on the ground is likely to reduce civilian casualties, because historically it has been the overreliance on American air strikes—as a result of too few ground forces—which has been the key cause of civilian deaths. According to the U.S. Air Force, between January and August 2008 there were almost 2,400 air strikes in Afghanistan, fully three times as many as in Iraq. And the United Nations concluded that it was air strikes, rather than action on the ground, which were responsible for the largest percentage—64 percent—of civilian deaths attributed to pro-government forces in 2008.
13. The Obama administration’s Afghan policy represent a distinct break from the Bush administration’s sputtering efforts. One is a shifting emphasis within the attempt to curtail the opium trade, from poppy eradication to going after the drug lords. This is a no-brainer—poppy eradication penalizes poor Afghan farmers who can’t pay the bribes to ensure their fields are not eradicated, and who are then easy marks for Taliban recruitment.
14. T he United States can neither precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan nor help foster the emergence of a stable Afghan state by doing it on the cheap; the consequence would be the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
15. The United States overthrew the Taliban in the winter of 2001. It has a moral obligation to ensure that when it does leave Afghanistan it does so secure in the knowledge that the country will never again be a launching pad for the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and that the country is on the way to a measure of stability and prosperity. When that happens, it is not too fanciful to think that Afghanistan’s majestic mountains, verdant valleys, and jasmine-scented gardens may once again draw the tourists that once flocked there.

Interesting editorial today in The Dayton Daily News says, “Poor children need quality teachers, too.” It implies that the teachers in poverty schools are inferior to the teachers in high income schools.

There are a lot of interesting comments.  Here is what Max said:

I am soooooo very tired of the poor performance of poverty-ridden districts being attributed to a “poor” teacher – there needs to be “better” teachers. Education is NOT meeting the needs of these students – there are not alternatives for disruptive students, they are left in the classroom to disrupt the educational process for all. Parents are not held accountable for sending students prepared for school. It’s an all encompassing problem – not just the teacher.

A lot of commentators at the DDN site agree with Max and make the point that there are a lot of factors that determine the overall quality of public education.  I keep coming back to the theory of systems taught by W. Edwards Demings that 85% of quality issues are system issues, only 15%, at most, are people issues.

Our biggest hope to bring about the big needed leap in quality in public education is via transforming the system — it’s an 85% opportunity, compared to 15% for all other opportunities added together.  We need a transformed system structure quite different from the structure we have today.  In my campaign to be elected to the Kettering School Board, I made this point in my League Of Women Voters statement:

Public education needs a big leap in quality — including a big leap in cost effectiveness. We need a ten year process of transformation that will result in a 21st century system of education. Community consensus is needed. Leadership is needed. The biggest challenge for the Kettering School Board is to lead the community in creating a shared vision of the future, and, in creating a well-thought out, long-term plan to bring that vision to reality.

I’d like to think that at least some of the 4481 Kettering citizens who voted for me — to be their school board representative — agreed with the idea that Kettering needs to develop a long term plan for transformation.

The DDN headline, “Poor children need quality teachers, too,” brings up a great question:  How is “quality teacher” defined? The DDN explains, “High-poverty schools, in both rural and urban areas, are avoided by many veteran teachers,”

The DDN seems to define “quality teacher” as “veteran teacher,” but that is not credible — any more than it would be credible to define “quality surgeon” as “veteran surgeon.”

It is impossible to describe the qualities of a “quality teacher,” without an understanding of what it is that a teacher is suppose to do.  In American public education today, there may be a lot of rhetoric about teacher quality, but the biggest task for a teacher, in order to be considered a quality teacher, is to adjust to the requirements of the system in which he or she works. The bureaucracy has a check list, and with enough checks the teacher is considered “highly qualified.”

The DDN reports: Ohio is working on a new teacher “career ladder” that allows top teachers to move from beginner, or “resident educator,” to higher rungs of accomplishment termed “professional,” “senior professional” and “lead professional.”

The problem is, if the bureaucracy says you are a “quality teacher,” or a “professional,” it hardly makes it so.  And, if the bureaucracy says your school is “excellent,” it hardly makes it so.

I am attempting to develop a vision of a transformed future and put it in a new Lulu book — “Kettering Public Education In The Year 2022: How Do We Get To A Great Future?” I am going to try to discipline myself to focus 45 minutes each day in its development.

In a transformed system of public education there would be a transformed meaning of how the term “quality teacher” is defined — as compared to how a “quality teacher” is now defined.  In a transformed system, there would be transformed meanings given to all now commonly used educational terms — such as, education, school, teacher, evaluation, student, grades, and learning.

A transformed system will have a transformed meaning of “excellence” as applied to these terms and the meaning of excellence will be based on a clear understanding of the system’s overall aim and purpose.

Here are some related articles from previous blogs:

1. The Kettering School Board’s Biggest Challenge Is To Gain Public Support For Transformation
2. “What Is The Purpose, The Aim Of Public Education?” — Every School Board Candidate Should Answer
3. We Are The Ones To Make A Better Place
4. Thinking Through Purposes and Principles Needed To Guide the Re-Design of Public Education